Lofgren, Zoe Perlmutter Snyder Price (NC) Lowey Solis Lynch Ramstad Speier Maloney (NY) Rangel Markey Richardson Sutton Matsui Rothman Tauscher McCarthy (NY) Roybal-Allard Thompson (MS) McCollum (MN) Ruppersberger Tierney McDermott Rush Towns Sánchez, Linda McGovern Tsongas McNulty T. Van Hollen Meeks (NY) Sanchez, Loretta Velázquez Miller (NC) Sarbanes Visclosky Schakowsky Miller, George Wasserman Moore (WI) Schiff Schultz Moran (VA) Schwartz Waters Murphy (CT) Scott (GA) Watson Nadler Scott (VA) Watt Napolitano Serrano Waxman Neal (MA) Sestak Weiner Olver Shavs Wexler Pallone Sherman Slaughter Woolsey Pascrell Smith (NJ) Pastor Wu Smith (WA) Yarmuth Payne

ANSWERED "PRESENT"-1

Obev

NOT VOTING—14

Bishop (NY) Dreier Lampson
Brady (TX) Ehlers Neugebauer
Cantor Hoekstra Pitts
Cleaver Hulshof Regula
Cubin King (IA)

□ 1116

Mr. HARE changed his vote from "aye" to "no."

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The title was amended so as to read: "A bill to restore Second Amendment rights in the District of Columbia.".

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated against:

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Speaker, when I voted on final passage of H.R. 6842, the Second Amendment Enforcement Act, I incorrectly voted aye. I meant to vote no on final passage of that bill.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Chairman, Earlier today, the House took sequential votes on an amendment to and final passage of the National Capital Security and Safety Act, H.R. 6842. On roll number 601 when I cast my vote on final passage an "aye" vote was recorded when a "no" vote should have been recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, (Mr. Chairman), on rollcall No. 600 and 601, I missed these votes due to illness (influenza). Had I been present, I would have voted "aye" on both.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote is objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later.

ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill (S. 3406) to restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The text of the Senate bill is as follows:

S. 3406

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "ADA Amendments Act of 2008".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

- (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
- (1) in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" and provide broad coverage;
- (2) in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers;
- (3) while Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled;
- (4) the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect;
- (5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA;
- (6) as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities;
- (7) in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term "substantially limits" to require a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Congress; and
- (8) Congress finds that the current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" are inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard.
- (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—
- (1) to carry out the ADA's objectives of providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination" and "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination" by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA;
- (2) to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures;
- (3) to reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.

471 (1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973:

- (4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms "substantially" and "major" in the definition of disability under the ADA "need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," and that to be substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA "an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives";
- (5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially limits", and applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis;
- (6) to express Congress' expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise that portion of its current regulations that defines the term "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.

SEC. 3. CODIFIED FINDINGS.

Section 2(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101) is amended—

- (1) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:
- "(1) physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of discrimination; others who have a record of a disability or are regarded as having a disability also have been subjected to discrimination;":
 - (2) by striking paragraph (7); and
- (3) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (7) and (8), respectively.

SEC. 4. DISABILITY DEFINED AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) DEFINITION OF DISABILITY.—Section 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12102) is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. DEFINITION OF DISABILITY.

- "As used in this Act:
- "(1) DISABILITY.—The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual—
- "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;
- "(B) a record of such an impairment; or
- "(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).
 - ``(2) Major life activities.—
- "(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,